Ein Markt - Eine Wahrung: Die Verhandlungen zur Europaischen Wirtschafts- und Wahrungsunion. Wilhelm Schonfelder/Elke Thiel. (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1994).
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Prior to the 1996 intergovernmental conference (IGC), a necessary debate about the future institutional structure of the European Union is taking shape. These two volumes provide historical perspective and practitioners' insight into that debate. It is relevant to consider the origins of the Community, and its institutions, from the vantage point of one of its Founding Fathers, Jean Monnet. It is also useful to assess the contributions of his approach to the Community during its evolution on the path to Union. These books can be used in the classroom to emphasize both the changing and sui generis nature of European integration and the negotiation dynamics that define the Union's character. Francois Duchene, a British correspondent in Paris prior to his work for Monnet, gives us much to consider. His volume is at once a well-researched biography of Jean Monnet and a rich historical account of European construction from the end of World War II until the late 1970s. The book is divided into two parts. The first chronicles Monnet's actions during his youth working for the family cognac business, his endeavors on behalf of the Allied cause in Europe during 1914-1945 and the creation and early development of the European Community. The early years were among Monnet's most creative. The cornerstone of his later experiences with the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community was laid by the trials and tribulations of Monnet's first achievements. These achievements were impressive: promoting cooperation between Britain and France concerning war supplies during the First World War; serving as deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations at 32; and contributing to the success of the "Victory Program," which supplied American weapons equipment to the Allies on the Continent during World War II. The second part of the book paints a vivid portrait of Monnet's legacy. Monnet is presented as a world citizen whose vision of unity transcended physical and psychological borders. He is also described as a person who understood the value of changing the context of a situation by transforming the basic facts. Monnet's consideration of the Franco-German relationship after the devastation of the Second World War and his formulation of the Schuman Plan exemplify this approach. Finally, there is a portrait of Monnet as a leader capable of transforming world events by introducing an alternative to the system of balance of power in Europe. Three themes dominate throughout this volume: creative genius; the role of Europe in the world; and Monnet's unique approach to negotiations. Monnet's creative genius was illustrated by his innovative plans for international cooperation among sovereign states. Duchene explains that Monnet operated on the basis of the utility principle- the pooling of scarce resources to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number. His favorite tool was the "balance sheet" which Monnet used to weigh the positive and negative aspects of each step in any given project. Each of his ideas illustrated the extent to which the role of Europe in the world was Monnet's over-riding concern. The Community was the main beneficiary of his resourcefulness. An impassioned advocate of a strong partnership with the United States, Monnet advanced the European cause by maintaining the support of key policy makers in Washington for his ideas. In his era, foreign policy was made more exclusively by a small group of policy elites on both sides of the Atlantic. The influence of interest groups on foreign policy making was not as strong as today. This explains in part Monnet's need to persuade the powerful and to organize negotiations by focusing on the interactions among a small group of persons seated at the table. In order to achieve his goals, Monnet invented a unique approach to negotiations.As Duchene points out, this approach was most obvious during the Schuman Plan conference in 1950. The six states involved in the conference, France, Germany, Italy and BENELUX, participated in more of an open conversation than a classical negotiation. As the German representative, Walter Hallstein, noted, "Monnet incarnated the spirit of European solidarity". The general Community interest was defined in an attempt to go one step beyond respective national interests. More importantly, the goal of the Schuman Plan conference was to "create something," namely, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Monnet's approach to negotiations earned him a lifelong reputation as "Mr. Europe". But after the failure of the European Defense Community on the floor of the French National Assembly in August 1954, Monnet resigned as president of the High Authority of the ECSC and returned to private life. Thereafter he used the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, an imposing transnational lobby, to gain access to heads of state and government who were able and willing to implement his ideas. The Action Committee's resolutions aimed to commit member political parties and labor unions to a strategy for unity. For Monnet, this Committee, which represented societal interests, had to have institutional force. Labor unions were included because Monnet felt they represented the broad masses and thus had a sense of the general interest. Although Monnet worked with elites his entire life to advance European unity, his was a civilian approach. As Duchene explains, this approach was much closer to the outlook of the citizen than that of the bureaucrat. Monnet worked on the assumption that all parties would benefit from European unity. He used the language of business, of community and of civil politics to make his case for closer integration among the Six. The fact that national parliaments, in which many of the Action Committee's members sat, had greater influence on policy making than is the case today served as a means to maintain general public awareness of integration. Monnet was sincere in his belief that "We are uniting people, not forming a coalition of states." However, the essence of Community policy was, and remains to the present day, highly technical and therefore incomprehensible to the average citizen.The evolution of Community policy-making throughout the 1970s and 1980s was in the direction of increased bureaucratization. The centralization of decision-making among political leaders in the European Council and the distance from national parliaments and publics became even greater. Also absent were talented personalities like Pierre Uri who could draft treaty language that was presentable to national publics. Thus the Community became more distant and diverse. The resulting "democratic deficit" was striking and the search for the general interest became even more difficult. As the shorter Schonfelder/Thiel volume explains, however, in the late 1980s the Community regained a certain forward momentum after nearly two decades of stalemate in Council voting procedures. Its leaders then adopted the Monnet approach to negotiate a treaty on European economic and monetary union (EMU). Ein Markt - Eine Wuhrung is a valuable addition to the growing literature on the EMU conference because it presents both the internal bargaining among German actors in Bonn and the diplomacy of the German delegation to the IGC in Brussels. Each of the steps leading up to the actual Maastricht negotiations in 1991 are outlined with significant attention focused on the work of the Delors Committee and the prenegotiation phase. It was in the definition of a three stage concept for EMU, and the introduction of a European currency as the point of departure for further integration, that the work of the Delors Committee most resembled Monnet's approach. As Schonfelder and Thiel point out, the role of Delors was crucial as a "hinge" between the the Delors Committee, consisting of central bank governors and three independent experts, and the ECOFIN Council. Like Monnet, Delors was content to let others make use of, and take credit for, his ideas. Ein Market - Eine Wuhrung has the additional advantage that one of its authors was involved in the formulation of German interests regarding EMU in Bonn. The other is an expert on European monetary affairs who explains developments in her chosen field with clarity and ease. Thus, each of the more difficult issues in the negotiation process is treated in turn with both the German positions and those of the other member states explained in detail. This volume is well-organized with a chapter at the end devoted to the EMU provisions in the Treaty on European Union. The reasons why EMU is in the German interest are presented in a balanced way. Less attention is paid, however, to an explanation of the underlying reasons behind the strong German public reaction against Stage Three of EMU or the ways in which the Treaty's contents can be made clearer to the public. Negotiators and analysts involved in Union affairs have drawn the conclusion that the closed manner in which Maastricht was negotiated proved to be a costly error for the integration process. Yet there is no mention made of ways to address this fact in light of the 1996 Revision Conference. The fact that another approach is needed, which takes popular feelings into account, remains relevant for practitioners and for those trying to understand the various directions taken by the integration process. If this review seems to be more of a resume than a critique, this is because I hope it will incite an American audience to read these books and to consider both the achievements of an extraordinary individual and the enduring nature of his contributions to European integration. Monnet worked with the Americans and against the odds to unify Europe. His emphasis on persuading elites had much to do with the way in which foreign policy was made in an earlier era. If Monnet was alive today, would he recognize the need to modify the emphasis on elites and to persuade the people that the European Union is relevant to their daily lives? This is clearly a rhetorical question, but it is one worth asking given the role that others like Jacques Delors or a revised Action Committee might play in the present context. One way to promote a public debate on the European Union is to make people more aware of the nature of its negotiation processes and the salient policy issues. The relevance of these volumes to this debate and to classroom teaching is due to the fact that each can be used in courses that involve model simulations of negotiations in the European Union. Duchene's consideration of the Monnet approach during the Schuman conference can provide an interesting contrast in style to classical intergovernmental conference diplomacy. The Schonfelder/Thiel volume teaches students about the need for levels of negotiation in IGC diplomacy, namely, personal representative, ministerial and heads of state and government. This book is written in German, but an English translation may be published. In any case, it provides important material for those who write case studies in English on European Union negotiations.* After reading these books, students can play out differences in decision-making and negotiation styles during model simulations. The 1996 Revision Conference is one simulation topic to which students can apply the insights in these volumes, for example. Both texts can also be used as supplementary readings in more general courses on the European Union. * Colette Mazzucelli, "A Decision in Dublin, An Agenda in Rome: Convening Parallel Conferences on European Union," Monnet Case Studies in European Affairs (New York: The Jean Monnet Council, 1995).
Colette Mazzucelli, | |||||