Colette Mazzucelli
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY & THE JEAN MONNET COUNCIL

"It is national institutions which shape the genius, the character, the tastes, and the manners of a people; which give it an individuality of its own; which inspire it with that ardent love of country, based on ineradicable habits, which make its members, while living among other peoples, die of boredom, though surrounded by delights denied them in their own land...." **

DEMOCRACY REVISITED: THE NOVEMBER 1994 ELECTIONS

The sweeping electoral victories for the Republican party in both Houses of Congress on 8 November were the sign of a deeper political malaise in the American political establishment. Polls revealed voters to be profoundly alienated from their elected representatives and the political process. Many persons admit to a deepening powerlessness and pessimism over the future of the country. (1)

The source of popular discontent with American politics no longer seems to be a cyclical phenomenon. Instead voters have expressed their dissatisfaction with what amount to systemic problems of government in modern industrial societies. A majority of those individuals asked were critical of politicians who remain in office too long. In their view, politics is viewed increasingly as an entitlement by too many elected officials in Washington. This turn of events stands in marked contrast to politics as a "vocation" described by the German sociologist Max Weber.

More than half, or 56 percent of those questioned in a New York Times/CBS News Poll, approved of their own representative, but only about a third thought that same official deserved re-election. When asked about Congress as a whole, only 12 percent thought most members of Congress should be sent back to Washington, while 82 percent wanted Congress to start from scratch with all new people. And yet more than half said that even if all new people were re-elected, the government would not work any better.

In the view of many persons asked, the problem of elected politicians who make lifelong careers in Washington is compounded by their closeness to lobbyists and special-interest groups. This creates a distance between these officials and the very people who put them in office. It is no wonder that a large number of Americans support term limits for elected representatives. Excessive bureaucracy was also cited as a significant issue with citizens favoring by a 2-1 margin less involvement by government in solving national problems. This popular viewpoint was generally in line with the Republican approach.

Public reactions against a "soft despotism" exercised by an overly centralized federal bureaucracy, described by Tocqueville in his classic Democracy in America, are still alive and well in the country over a century later. Not surprisingly, 57 percent of those polled also thought that the United States needs a new political party. (2) The kind of political platform a third party might present remains vague. Yet, a return to traditional societal values is favored by increasing numbers of the population as evidenced by the grass roots support for the fundamentalist right wing of the Republican party. Its most outspoken candidate Oliver North lost a fierce electoral contest in Virginia. His credible showing though illustrates the appeal of a conservative, anti-establishment and populist message among a growing minority of voters. The significance of North's campaign is best understood in the context of changing popular perceptions of American interests at home and abroad.

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN INTERESTS

Those Republican candidates for the House of Representatives ran a campaign based on a "Contract With America" embracing a tangle of contradictory economic-policy goals that defy the conventional wisdom about what is politically possible and challenges Congress to restructure in a fundamental way the role of government. The 10-point program that Republicans ran on - and Democrats ran against- promises House votes on a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced budget by 2002, a stronger military and multi-billion dollar tax cuts over the next five years. (3)

In the view of many analysts, balancing the budget without touching either Social Security or Medicare - which Republican leaders vowed to protect - while strengthening the military and cutting taxes would require deep and politically painful cuts in remaining federal programs. Republicans say that it just the point. Newt Gingrinch, Republican of Georgia and the next House Speaker, has remarked that this sort of sweeping reduction in government - along with a whole new approach to federal budget accounting - is what the Republicans' dramatic election victory was all about. However, liberal and conservative commentators alike fear that the more likely result of the Republican economic strategy, which offers more detail about proposed tax cuts than the spending reductions to offset them, will be a return to the soaring deficits of the Reagan era. (4)

Unfortunately for the Republicans, 71 percent of voters polled had never heard of their much-promoted "Contract With America." This is just one more illustration of the distance that separates political elites and citizens in most Western democracies. Public perceptions of American interests are much more narrowly focused on societal concerns, most particularly crime. This issue has emerged as a stark symbol of fear and powerlessness especially in the larger cities where drug use destroys whole neighborhoods. Economic concerns rank second for many Americans who are concerned about unemployment figures and the state of the domestic job market in light of the NAFTA debate last year. Health care, which dominated the 1994 congressional agenda, is now fifth on the list of pressing concerns, tied with drugs.

Popular views of President Clinton's leadership are still mixed. Almost 50 percent of Americans asked doubt his overall performance. The President's recent foreign policy ventures in Iraq and Haiti have earned him higher praise. However, the public remains largely "uneasy" over Clinton's "ability to deal wisely with a difficult international crisis". Moreover, voters still do not give him credit for improving the economy and quite a few think, wrongly, that Clinton's budget actually raised the deficit. A comparison of the figures shows that in the fiscal year ending September 1992 the deficit was at a high of $290.4 billon. In the fiscal year ending September 1994, the deficit had fallen to $203.4 billion. (5) This public misperception is perhaps the most striking illustration of the Clinton team's inability to get his domestic priorities across to the American people.

While the American people expect Clinton to show competence in foreign policy, his proposed domestic initiatives were the reason why the Democrats triumphed in the 1992 presidential elections. The overwhelming public mood is one of how to ensure personal security, both economic and physical, in defense of American interests at home. Foreign policy issues are largely viewed as tangential to this fundamental challenge even when problems arise in countries as close geographically to the United States as Haiti. The connection between domestic policies and foreign affairs has not been made in many voters minds. Moreover, issues of national sovereignty still dominate debates on American participation in NAFTA, the United Nations, NATO and the GATT, with questions raised about the potential US role in the World Trade Organization (WTO). (6)

CLINTON'S EUROPEAN AGENDA

President Clinton came into office two years ago squarely in the liberalist tradition of international affairs. His view of American foreign policy was that of an extension of domestic, namely, economic issues. Clinton's goal to focus on the American agenda was understandable given his campaign promises. However, it proved impossible to maintain this domestic emphasis at the cost of international diplomacy given the crises in the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East and Africa. The President's trip to Berlin in July 1994 dealt with a central theme of his European policy: the forging of a partnership with the Federal Republic of Germany to facilitate the gradual integration of the newly emerging democracies in central and eastern Europe into the European Union and NATO.

During his trip to Berlin on 12 July, which took place under the German Presidency of the European Union, President Clinton held a joint press conference with Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Commission President Jacques Delors. As part of his statement during this press conference, Clinton explained that expert groups including both Europeans and Americans would be set up in two areas: to strengthen coordination and cooperation in support of democracy and reform in central and eastern Europe; and to coordinate better transatlantic cooperation on issues of internal security like drug-trafficking, money-laundering and organized crime. (7) A third expert group on the transatlantic dialogue in the context of common foreign and security policy issues (CFSP) has also been organized. (8) The goal of the first expert group is to identify potential concrete areas of EU-US cooperation to the east of the Continent and to present these findings to the European Council in Cannes at the end of the French Presidency in June 1995. So far all the groups have had only preliminary organizational meetings. However, the dialogue on central and eastern Europe envisaged in the Transatlantic Declaration of 23 November 1990 is beginning to take shape.

In the area of military policy, three exercises have been carried out so far this year under the auspices of the Partnership for Peace (PFP), President Clinton's proposal for increased cooperation between NATO and countries including the Visegrad States, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Lithuania. The President explained his proposal in Warsaw during his first trip to Europe in mid-January 1994, but it failed to receive an enthusiastic reception from either the Poles, who received no explicit security guarantees, or the Russians who fear any prelude to the expansion of NATO closer to their own borders. (9) The first exercise took place in Poland, the second was a naval exercise and the third occurred in the Netherlands. By all accounts, these exercises are establishing patterns of cooperation among all countries involved which is an important end in itself. The manoeuvres also aim to prepare the countries outside NATO for eventual membership in the alliance. At present, lists are being put together for next year's PFP exercises with plans to possibly include some bilateral or trilateral exercises like those taking place among Germany, Denmark and Poland. (10)

Regarding multilateral economic assistance to the countries of central and eastern Europe, in 1989 the European Commission assumed the responsibility to coordinate this aid in the context of the G-24. Initially, assistance was channeled to Poland and Hungary. However, ten more countries have been added since that time including the Baltic states, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Slovenia and Macedonia. Croatia was included in this group, but its aid was suspended due to the war in the former Yugoslavia. It will most likely be readmitted into this group of aid recipients in the future. The European Union has its PHARE program of assistance to the countries of central and eastern Europe whereas the United States has a program of bilateral assistance in the form of Support for Emerging European Democracies (SEED) monies. In the five year period from 1990-1995 almost $2 billion in SEED funds have been earmarked for the countries in the region.

The PHARE and SEED programs are just two of about twenty or so programs coordinated by the European Commission for the G-24 and international financial institutions. The major portion of early aid was in the form of macro financial assistance to help individual countries with their balance of payments accounts. As the process of reform deepened to a structural level, sectoral assistance working groups were formed in areas such as transport, agriculture, nuclear safety and democratic institutions. Although it made sense to hande some issues like transport on a horizontal basis due to obvious geographical links among countries in the region, eventually many of the horizontal groups were disbanded in spring 1993. Discussions were thereafter handled on a country by country basis.

More recently, there has been some overlap between the economic assistance process in the context of G-24 and US ad hoc coordination with the European Commission toward the countries of central and eastern Europe. The idea is to make the assistance programs complementary to one another. Three senior level meetings have already taken place. The idea of the Clinton Administration is to build an edifice of regional assistance, beginning in Poland, and to establish a US-EU dialogue of cooperation in this area. In spite of the fact that academic observers have commented on the increased links between economics and security issues, there is no overlap between the activities taking place in the Partnership for Peace and those occurring as a result of either G-24 multilateral assistance or the three US-EU ad hoc working groups. (11)

INTEGRATION SINCE MAASTRICHT: AMERICAN VIEWS

A poll conducted in the first half of March revealed that Americans are evenly divided about whether Japan, China or Western Europe is the strongest candidate to join the United States for world leadership. Americans also feel that the Middle East poses the biggest threat to peace. Those polled said, by a 59-to-31 margin, that the United States "has a responsibility to contribute military troops to enforce peace plans in trouble spots around the world when it is asked by the United Nations." (12) To the extent that America can work together with the European Union to address some of the world's problems, like finding multilateral solutions to regional conflicts, there is an overall positive feeling in American public opinion for European integration.

Other polls reveal that American public concern over relations with the European Union is much less pronouned than with Japan. Over 50 percent feel that the 1992 program to complete the internal market will "improve relations" with the United States. (13) However, American public support for the European Union seems to be more conditional than in the past. Short-term fluctuations can be prompted by highly publicized differences in the context of the GATT negotiations, for instance. American opinion was divided on the bitter battle between the European Union and the United States over film and television exports in world trade talks last year, to cite one noteworthy example. Editorials in American newspapers voiced support for the EU's "Television without Frontiers" directive, which requires broadcasters to devote a majority of air time to European works. However, outspoken critics of the directive, like Jack Valenti, chief lobbyist for the top US film studios, still argue for more open competition, not closed borders. The importance of cooperation between the two sides has been acknowledged though in a series of discreet meetings between US and European filmmakers during the past year. The American side is planning concrete initiatives, including financial grants, to help boost the European Union's struggling film industry. (14)

What may indeed be the greatest challenge to foster positive American sentiment about European integration is a lack of sufficient information regarding the developments taking place since Maastricht. This is a problem in European countries as well as the debates during the national ratification processes of the Treaty on European Union illustrated. One difficulty in particular is the complex nature of the Treaty itself which even experts have trouble explaining. For example, in an otherwise excellent book on one of the Community's Founding Fathers, Jean Monnet, its author, a European historian, writes: "The Treaty of Maastricht, signed on December 11, 1991, and aiming at monetary integration and greater political cooperation, has made the institutions into pillars of a single European Union." Clearly, in the Treaty context, the institutions and the pillars are quite different things. Further on, he writes, "...and the European Community itself is part of the European Union, the other part of which consists of intergovernmental regimes covering monetary union, foreign policy, security, and law and order." In fact monetary union is in the first pillar, namely the "acquis communautaire" or Community competences, and is therefore not an intergovernmental regime. (15) If confusion exists among European experts about these points, due to the excessive complexity of the Treaty language and structure, it is no wonder that American laypersons also have difficulties understanding integration.

The need for clarity in explaining the both the concrete advances made in European integration and the implications of such changes for the transatlantic relationship is more significant than ever in the aftermath of the recent Republican victories. Although many European analysts see little change in US foreign policy as a result of the Republican majority in both Houses of Congress, there is a strong likelihood that President Clinton will be in a weaker position in the domestic and international contexts. (16) His successes including the Middle East peace negotiations, the North Korean nuclear accord, the restoration of Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in Haiti, the dipatch of troops to protect Kuwait and US support for Russian President Boris Yeltsin may now give way to a more hard-line Republican view of America's role in the world. The Republicans' implicit premise is that notwithstanding America's emergence from the Cold War as the one remaining world power, its security is not ensured but needs to be bolstered. Their further implication is that Russia has not conclusively turned the Communist corner but retains a capacity for menace.

Meanwhile, the Republicans are at pains to protect the United States from suffering incursions upon its sovereignty or its freedom of movement by international bodies such as the United Nations. The Republican vision of the American role in the world is open to challenge. The reading of American insecurity is willfully lopsided in its emphasis on strictly military threats and its neglect of the dangers and responsibilities arising from ethnic rivalries, global poverty, population, drugs and migrations, to name just a few issues. (17) The challenge of the media, of universities and research institutes and of the revolution in communications technology is to inform the American public about the changes in a world that is less apocalyptic and more democratic, while at the same time more disorderly and inherently less stable.

MEDIA COVERAGE AND SOCIETAL CONCERNS

American news coverage of international relations in general and European affairs in particular is largely overshadowed by domestic issues. In some cases, headline news is symptomatic of the trappings of excessive materialism and instant gratification in the American society. Two events which captured media and the country's attention were about sports figures and episodes of violence. The first involved an Olympic figure skater Tanya Harding who was aware of a deliberately planned physical attack on a fellow skater, Nancy Kerrigan. Their sports rivalry and the amount of money involved in American sports competition led to this disgraceful display of unsportsmanlike conduct. The second, a much more brutal episode in which a former football star, O.J. Simpson, is accused of murdering his former wife and a male friend of hers, still grips the country. The public's fascination with this type of "story" and the media's constant reporting of such events is, to say the least, unhealthy. The intelligent popular reaction voices concern about a media "out of control" that focuses on "bad" because it sells. The Simpson case is a prime example.

Many Americans also admit that the media "gets in the way" of solving the country's problems and usually makes things appear worse than they are. The media frenzy about President and Mrs. Clinton's involvement in the Whitewater affair, comparing it to Watergate, is another case in point. In the early days of American broadcast journalism, it was Edward R. Murrow who stood up to the anti-Communist rhetoric of the demagogue Senator Joseph McCarthy. Now more than ever there is a need for journalists who inform the public about the crucial debates of the day like NAFTA, the changing nature of immigration in America and the GATT/WTO. These issues show the link between domestic and foreign affairs and its relevance to the lives of ordinary citizens. Such information should be treated in greater depth than what amounts to soundbites in between television commercials. More public television programs, including imports from the BBC and the RAI, are to be encouraged in order to inform Americans about world news.

One of the most disturbing electoral results of 8 November was the resounding vote in California in favor of Proposition 187, which seeks to end illegal immigration by denying government services to illegal immigrants and their children. For a nation that was built on immigrant labor and which prides itself on the assimilation of cultural diversity, this was a rude awakening. Societal concerns about the loss of jobs and shrinking funds available for education, health and welfare services have reached new dimensions. In terms of any comparison with the European experience of democracy, two points must be raised, however. First, it is questionable at best whether Proposition 187 will decide the fate of illegal immigration in the United Strates. In a shrinking world where economies overlap, where we no longer know where our automobiles are assembled, the great question as we head into the next century is: What is a border? (18) Furthermore, how do we consider in a humane way the rights of displaced persons who flee their homelands in order to survive? These questions are as valid for the democracies of Europe which also face burning issues of economic migration and political asylum. Theirs is perhaps a more trying experience with immigrant diversity because of somewhat more homogeneous domestic populations and deeply rooted national traditions.

The second point, however, is that the lessons of democracy and tolerance for the United States are now taking place in a very different societal context than in earlier generations. This context colors the perceptions Americans have of identity and society. Sharp changes in immigration patterns, magnified by differences in fertility rates, are transforming the United States from a "melting pot" into one of the world's first truly cosmopolitan societies. Demographic trends point in a direction that would have been unthinkable to the Founding Fathers: by the second half of the 21st century, European and their descendants - the ethnic group that has dominated the United States for more than 200 years - may well be outnumbered by other racial groups. (19) The difficulties inherent in the assimilation of these new groups should be acknowledged and the corresponding problems considered without reverting to false parallels or romanticized views of the earlier immigrant story in America.

Popular fears about immigration run deep. The underlying problem is that the decision to loosen immigration policy and shift the mix toward Asians and Hispanics was not the result of a vigorous public debate. Americans did not consciously decide their country was under-populated and insufficiently cosmopolitan. The big changes of recent decades have taken nearly everyone by surprise. (20) This brings us back to the need for more open lines of communication leading to a more balanced dialogue between elites, whether politicians or civil servants, and individual citizens in modern democratic polities. Here the experiences and lessons of administrative reform in the emerging democracies of central and eastern Europe can provide valuable insights. In this regard, it is strongly argued that in Poland today, administrators need to have the capacity for open, convincing and effective cooperation with the public. In other words, an explicit acknowledgement of the educative responsibility of officials as representatives of the state is an important choice for Poles to make as democratic government takes root. (21)

UNIVERSITIES AND RESEARCH

Education in its broadest sense is one of the bulwarks of a democratic society. In his classic work Idea of a University, John Henry Newman writes that "that training of the intellect, which is best for the individual himself, best enables him to discharge his duties to society." In his dialogue with Newman's work, titled The Idea of the University - A Reexamination, Jaroslav Pelikan relates what Newman calls the university's "duties to society" to what Edmund Burke calls "the little platoon we belong to," to "our country," and to "mankind" each in turn. Thus, Pelikan considers research and teaching, the two principal components of "the business of a University" in three distinct contexts- local, national and international. (22) His discussion of these themes leads to an observation particularly relevant to the American and European experiences. This is that the predominant "duties to society" have been "the duties of the university to its national society, in preference to either its local or international society."

In the American system of education, much work remains to be done to develop courses at the elementary, secondary and university levels in which the international dimension of society, and the United States role in this emerging environment, are thoughtfully debated. The passage of NAFTA, the present challenges of illegal immigration in several states, and the newest American goal of creating an even larger free trade area with the Asia and Pacific countries by 2020, each illustrate the dynamic nature of and potential for societal change in the United States. Frank discussion about strategies to deal with the sociological implications of these recent developments are necessary. So is the need to establish legal norms to counter the potentially explosive precedent set by Proposition 187. These are examples of the "duties to international society" confronting educators and non-governmental institutions in an era when governments are overwhelmed by tasks of crisis management.

In some cases, entire departments of study must be reorganized to reflect changing geo-political and socio-economic realities as in the example of Europe in the post Cold War era. Rigorous methodological training of "eastern" experts should complement programs to provide linguistic skills for western specialists so as to prepare a new generation of analysts and practitioners of European affairs in the United States. Their training in fields such as integration should be less theory driven and more practically oriented. Concerns to be addressed could include, for example, the changing nature of states as they engage in competitive cooperation in a global market like telecommunications, which shapes the nature of human discourse. The influence of European Union institutions such as the Council on the negotiating style of the national civil servants who must adapt to its rules of procedure is a topic in the liberalist tradition worthy of consideration. Research on the ways in which individual members of civil society engage in a dialogue about their duties and rights as citizens with representatives of local and state institutions is as relevant to the French and German societies as to the Polish one. In terms of European citizenship, it is necessary to explore the emerging transnational dialogue between citizens and the ombudsman in the European Parliament.

In the United States, an important goal of non-profit organizations like the European Community Studies Association (ECSA), the Robert Bosch Foundation Alumni Association (RBFAA), the GLObal Systems Analysis and Simulation Association in the U.S.A. (GLOSAS/USA) and the Jean Monnet Council is to disseminate information and research on the common challenges facing societies in America and Europe as we enter the next millenium. Through these non-profit organizations, broader geographical networks of concerned individuals in European-American relations than those that existed after World War II are being created to exert influence on policy makers. During an era in which grass roots interest groups in the United States have a much stronger "voice" in international economic and political affairs like the GATT negotiations, there is a need to educate citizens to an even greater extent about world issues. A more intensive dialogue across space and time in which national borders no longer play a role is a necessary component of instruction at all levels of education. It is time to create a classroom for the 21st century. (23)

In Europe the sensitivity of national education systems to change is readily acknowledged. Nonethless, as a result of the Maastricht Treaty, Articles 126 & 127, a European dimension to education is gradually being introduced in order to complement national efforts. In this regard, it is also significant that the European Union plans to open its academic exchange and research programs to universities in central and eastern Europe. (24) The proposal for expansion, if adopted as planned, would enable these universities to participate fully in Union programs. In the ERASMUS exchanges alone, more than 100,000 students last year did academic work for credit in a western European country other than their own. The ERASMUS program is to be succeeded by another generation of programs including SOCRATES and, for vocational training, LEONARDO DA VINCI. In terms of its democratic legitimacy, Community legislation in this area is made via the new co-decision procedure between Council and Parliament. The European Parliament in particular has emphasized the need to achieve the goal of at least 10 percent participation in the SOCRATES program for the period 1 January 1995 to 31 December 1999. Furthermore, it encourages mutual academic recognition of diplomas, periods of study and other qualifications especially through the further development of the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) which was modelled on the American experience of higher education. The European Parliament also urges the expansion of these educational programs to the countries of central and eastern Europe. Such Community legislation is essential in order to lay the foundations of European civil society.

As a corollary, in its duties to international society, European education must tackle the growing problems of racism and xenophobia on the Continent by showing concretely how peoples from different cultures can live, study and work together. Such tasks in education are on the agenda of an independent Committee presently making recommendations to the European Council. The author is observing the work of this Committee during her time at the German Foreign Ministry. The origins of the Consultative Committee to deal with issues of "Racism and Xenophobia" date back to a Franco-German initiative at the 63rd bilateral summit meeting in Mulhouse. The Committee was established at the European Council in Corfu in June 1994 on the initiative of Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Fran‡ois Mitterrand. Among its recommendations to the Essen European Council include changes to the Maastricht Treaty to give the European Union clear competence to fight discrimination on grounds of race, ethnic origin or religion. (25)

Clearly the role of communication among peoples, whether through foreign language learning or increased exposure to different cultural environments, is a fundamental one if we are to succeed in our goals of education and tolerance. It is precisely in the area of information technology that improvements in infrastructure must be made in order to keep up with the revolution in communications that is presently taking place. Efforts in this direction are being made, notably by the Bangemann Group in Brussels, in conjunction with the liberalization of telecommunications monopolies in the member states of the European Union. (26) The European Commission will host a G-7 Summit to discuss ways in which to improve infrastructures for the use of information technologies in Feburary 1995. What remains to be defined, however, is a transatlantic strategy in this area particularly with regard to the countries of central and eastern Europe. There are several ways in which such a strategy could be useful, particularly in the field of management training. (27)

THE COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION

The United States, led by ideas and initiatives coming directly from Vice-President Al Gore, is energetically engaged in building an information superhighway for the next century. In France a proposed $100 billion project would equip every French household with fiber optic cables within 20 years. The plan is to install fiber optic connections in businesses and homes to link them to the information superhighways in a project to be completed by 2015. About 300,000 jobs stand to be created - not least in the subsequent boom in home-based work which would follow. There is little opposition to the concept of connecting everyone to the network. Germany, with its Opal project, Japan and the US are the only other major countries to have a national fiber optics network project under development. (28) Such governmental projects exist alongside the many private undertakings which are increasingly transatlantic in nature. Almost every European phone company has forged transatlantic alliances, partnerships, joint ventures and share swaps.

British Telcom has struck a $5.3 billion deal with MCI Inc.; Deutsche Telekom and France Telcom paid $4.3 billion for a 20 percent stake in Sprint; and Unisource, a grouping of the Dutch, Spanish, Swedish and Swiss telecom firms, forged an operating partnership with AT&T. There are obvious mutual benefits. The U.S. firms gain entry into an information services market the European Commission reckons will be worth around $300 billion by 1997, with telecommunications accounting for abour $170 billion. In return, the smaller European firms will gain access to global networks and state-of-the-art technology. The danger that private monopolies will simply replace public ones is a real one, however. Therefore, "the correct application of European competition rules remains one of the main tasks of the European Commission," in the words of Competition Commissioner Karel Van Miert. (29)

The implications of the communications revolution are emormous for civil society. This is because the masses have the potential to be involved in educational projects that foster "participatory democracy" on a local, national and transnational scale. This is indeed a way to "re-vision" democracy in a way that considers global challenges from the grass roots level upwards. Obviously, Rousseau's message to the Poles takes on quite a different meaning in the modern context given the fact that national institutions, while still important, can no longer afford to isolate themselves from global networks as we enter the 21st century. The question for industrialized countries to ask is how can governments keep their societies actively involved in the democratic process in an era when ambition for, or the preservation of, material comforts threatens to alienate individuals from collective goals of a regional, national or international nature. Of course, many issues remain to be solved. At present, the majority of persons do not own personal computers. Nor are they aware of the rapid advances in the field made daily across the globe. It is also a legitimate question to ask whether advances in basic infrastructure in third world countries should be funded prior to using monies to link these countries to the Internet.

Yet, there is reason to believe that within the next decade, progress will be made among technical experts from different parts of the world, including the least developed countries, to foster links in the direction of a global electronic distance education delivery system. Here the significance of progress lends a new dimension to media information, education, and, of course, communications as Americans as well as citizens of other countries are challenged to take advantage of opportunities offered to them in their own homes. Since free and readily available access to information is one of the most basic needs of a democracy, progress in this area should be a priority of governments and international institutions. This priority should not overlook, however, the need for regulations to determine the proper use of the information superhighway.

COMPETITIVE COOPERATION OR PARTNERSHIP IN LEADERSHIP?

There are many common problems facing the European Union and the United States. Immigration, the integration of unskilled workers into a new information society, unemployment, the distance between political elites and citizens are but a few. These problems also transcend the transatlantic partnership which is why it is more important than ever that the two sides learn to work together. There is reason to believe that transatlantic relations are undergoing a learning period of adjustment to change in the aftermath of the Cold War. The traditional institutions of transatlantic cooperation must adapt to a new environment in which the European Union is still growing and learning as a polity. The challenge for the American public is to avoid a retreat to domesticism and unilateralism during the next few years. (30) Any attempts at transatlantic cooperation to develop a strategy to assist the countries in central and eastern Europe could be viewed as a way of looking outward to create new patterns of mutual understanding. The obstacles in the way are large particularly given differences in areas like agricultural subsidies and market access. There are competitive approaches to economic issues which will undoubtedly re-emerge in any future global trade talks. There are also difficulties inherent in establishing a partnership with a polity like the Union whose members do not always agree on its basic political ambitions. This is why flexibility is a necessary requirement on both sides to find areas of potential cooperation and limit possible damage on questions where there is wide disagreement.

The most basic challenge for both polities, however, is to retain the support of citizens for the democratic process in an era when political leadership is often mediocre. The contributions of civil society to the democratic process are one way to inject individual creativity and initiative into what has admittedly become an increasingly bureaucratized political environment on both sides of the Atlantic. This is why as the United States and the European Union develop a strategy to assist the newly emerging democracies, the projects on which they choose to cooperate should "re-vision" democracy in two ways: first, by appealing to American and Union citizens and non-governmental institutions for their support; and second, by undertaking projects that also foster communication between civil societies and state institutions in central and eastern Europe.

NOTES

* This text is a revised version of a talk given by the author at the Maria Curie-Sklodowska University in Pulawy, Poland for the USIS Speakers Program on 28 October 1994.

** The quote is taken from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Considerations on the Government of Poland (1772)," as cited in Rousseau on International Relations eds. Stanley Hoffmann & David P. Fidler (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 168.

(1) Katharine Q. Seelye, "Poll Finds Voters Profoundly Alienated From Political Process," The New York Times, November 3, 1994, 1.

(2) Ibid

(3) Clay Chandler, "Experts Shudder as Republicans Try to Meet 'Contract'," International Herald Tribune, November 19-20, 1994, 3.

(4) Ibid

(5) Seelye, 1.

(6) Paul F. Horvitz, "Dole Wants Exit Hatch From World Trade Unit," International Herald Tribune, November 17, 1994, 1; David E. Sanger, "New Status Lands Dole in Trade Dilemma," International Herald Tribune, November 19-20, 1994, 1.

(7) Joint News Conference Following US-EUSummit, (US Mission to the Eurpean Union), 3.

(8) Interview, US Embassy, Bonn, 21 November 1994.

(9) David White, "NATO's unequal Partnership for Peace," Financial Times, January 11, 1994, 3.

(10) Interview, US Embassy, Bonn, 22 November 1994.

(11) Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 21 November 1994.

(12) Steven Greenhouse, "Poll Shows 4 Nations Differ on the Main Threat to Peace," New York Times, April 2, 1994, A6.

(13) Kevin Featherstone and Roy H. Ginsberg, The United States and the European Community in the 1990s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

(14) Suzanne Perry, "Hollywood set to help European filmmakers," Reuter, November 3, 1994.

(15) Fran‡ois Duchˆne, Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994), 20 & 309.

(16) Jonathan Clayton, "Europe sees little change in U.S. foreign policy," Reuter, November 9, 1994.

(17) Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Reaction Abroad Underestimates the Change in America," International Herald Tribune, November 19-20, 1994, 8.

(18) Richard Rodriguez, "Illegals Are the Bravest of All," International Herald Tribune, November 17, 1994, 5.

(19) Michael Prowse, "The declining relevance of Europeans," Financial Times, January 10, 1994, 13.

(20) Ibid

(21) Janusz Letowski, "Polish Public Administration Between Crisis and Renewal" in Administrative Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Joachim Jens Hesse, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 9-10.

(22) Jaroslav Pelikan, The Idea of the University - A Reexamination (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), 139.

(23) Takeshi Utsumi and Colette Mazzucelli, "A Classroom for the 21st Century: Global Distance Education and Its Uses in Political Science," (in progress).

(24) Burton Bollag, "European Union to Open Exchanges to Universities in the East," The Chronicle of Higher Education, November 2, 1994, A62.

(25) John Carvel, "EU warned of growing racism," The Guardian, November 17, 1994.

(26) "EU to Debate How to Replace Telecom Monopolies," International Herald Tribune, November 17, 1994, 13; "A Feeding Frenzy in European Telecom," Business Week, November 7, 1994, 18-19.

(27) "Europe:The Push East," Business Week, November 7, 1994, 26-29.

(28) Ian Harding,"$100bn to put France on the superhighway," The European, 28 October-3 November 1994, 17.

(29) Bruce Barnard, "Advances in E.U.'s Telecommunications Market Drive Pace of Decontrol, The Journal of Commerce, November 9, 1994.

(30) Michael Smith and Stephen Woolcock, "Learning to cooperate: the Clinton administration and the European Union," International Affairs, 70 (1994): 459-476.