

***Franco-German Contributions to the Common Foreign and Security Policy:
The Area of Conflict Prevention/Resolution with a Perspective on Enlargement***

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“...No security structure predicated on an assumed mutual hostility of two great groups of European peoples, and of the two semi-European superpowers, will be adequate - indeed, as no such structure will be suitable - for the Europe of the future. In one way or another, a new all-European security structure, a structure resembling nothing that has ever existed in the past, will have to be created. And we Americans, at the present time one of the four greatest military powers on the European continent, will have to be heavily involved in its creation ...In this respect, Europe, the new Europe that must proceed from this present crisis, will need to be, as Europe has so often been in the past, the innovator, the pioneer, the pathbreaker for people in other parts of the world. And we Americans, poorly prepared as we are, will have to summon up, out of the great but scattered resources we possess, the information, the thoughtfulness, and the originality to play a worthy part in this great act of international creativity.”

-George F. Kennan, A New Age of European Security (1989)

This paper analyzes French and German views on the evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The paper analyzes CFSP's early success in central and eastern Europe in the area of conflict prevention. CFSP's more recent emphasis on issues of crisis management and peace keeping, as outlined in the Petersberg tasks, is also evaluated. In both cases, a perspective on the future enlargement of the European Union (EU) is taken. Various approaches to international politics will be utilized to explain the changes which could influence the development of CFSP as one of the main pillars of the European Union.

French views on CFSP - Maastricht

As one of two initiators of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in tandem with Germany, France places the highest priority on its development.¹ Given the country's traditional emphasis on independence in security and defense, a legacy of Gaullist doctrine, French diplomatic policy aims to use the CFSP and, in the larger sense, the European Union as an instrument to maintain its international presence. The rhythm of German unification in 1989-90 set the pace for Mitterrand, in a joint letter with Kohl, to call for a second intergovernmental conference on Political Union in March 3, 1990. Although the agreement in Maastricht on CFSP in December 9-10, 1991 was due in large part to the Franco-German line, underlying differences create a tension in their relationship.

¹Colette Mazzucelli, *France and Germany at Maastricht Politics and Negotiations to Create the European Union* (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1997).

In line with French thinking, the CFSP was placed in a second, intergovernmental, pillar of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) with the European Commission, Parliament and Court of Justice playing little or no roles. Unanimous voting remained the rule with only limited scope for qualified majority voting (QMV) in pre-determined areas. Three main changes are noted in security policy as introduced by the Maastricht Treaty:

- the European Union is given the authority to determine common positions in matters including economic or political sanctions against states;
- the Union may agree on joint actions like monitoring elections with resources committed to specific policies within an established time frame;
- the Union is given the right to “coordinate defense activity within the Western European Union,” thus opening up the defense dimension to a far greater degree than before.²

The Franco-German negotiating line foresaw the establishment of a European security and defense policy within the Union using WEU as the bridge between the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). There was also a broader agreement among the Twelve to revisit CFSP during the 1996 Review Conference.

A consideration of French policy in security and defense must take into account that this is the area where France has traditionally asserted its rank and status. In an era when there is a less than “certain idea of France” among the country’s elites and population, in which being medium is “problematic,” feeling “lost in the crowd” in Europe is evident and the search for “identity” is as elusive as ever³, defining a CFSP with a, if not the, leading role for France takes on significant dimensions.

This fact explains in large part why CFSP was created in Maastricht within the framework of a traditional model of foreign and security policy. As Rummel writes, “Basically, the CFSP has reproduced the old structures and contents of external relations at the national levels.”⁴ The reserved reaction of the French to the Schäuble-Lamers paper advocating a “core Europe” including France,

²Alain Guyomarch, Howard Machin and Ella Ritchie, *France in the European Union* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998), p. 121; Stuart P. Mackintosh, “The Bureaucratic Politics of CFSP in the European Union: The Roles of Germany, France and Britain,” in Fraser Cameron, Roy Ginsberg and Josef Janning with a Summary of Discussion by Stuart Mackintosh, *The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: Central Issues...Key Players*(Washington, DC: The Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), pp. 1-10.

³Dominique Moïsi, “The Trouble with France,” *Foreign Affairs* Volume 77, Number 3 (May/June 1998): 94-104.

⁴Reinhardt Rummel, “The Foreign Policy of the EU: Moving from Procedure to Substance,” SWP - IP 2998 (Ebenhausen: SWP, Januar 1997), p. 13.

Germany and the BENELUX countries, submitted to the Bundestag in September 1994, is testimony to the country's unwillingness to go beyond the classical framework of intergovernmental diplomacy in this area. Essentially France uses Europe as a lever to boost its own influence and prestige on the international stage. The realist approach to international relations with its emphasis on the primacy of states, their role as unitary actors and the emphasis on the pursuit of national power, offers much in the way of explaining French interests and preferences. Liberal theories of international relations do not explain French actions or motivations since the roles of societal actors and of transnational alliances are irrelevant. The executive, in the person of the President, plays the decisive role. The Constitution of 1958 allows the Prime Minister and Parliament limited power at best even in recent periods of *cohabitation* during which powers are shared by the government and the opposition party.

German Views on CFSP - Maastricht

The German interest in the creation of a European common foreign and security policy was characterized from the start by two fundamental national preferences: the maintenance of a strong link with NATO; and the communitarization of the policy, which implies by definition a strong role for the European institutions and the use of qualified majority voting in decision making procedures. Germany's interest in European integration and the development of common policies with its neighbors derives from its geographical position, its history and its economic dependence on trade exports, particularly within the Union, but increasingly in the pan-European context. Significantly, foreign and security policy provokes less domestic institutional conflict than other integration policies. This is the case among the federal ministries apportioned by party in a system of coalition politics. It is also true between the executive and the legislature in the Federal Republic's parliamentary democracy or among the federal, state and communal levels in its political system.

The complex and varied dimensions of the German interest in a common foreign and security policy are bound to cause tension with its French partner. Another area of divisiveness with France is the extent to which Germans are inclined to take on a role in global security. Here there are clear constraints which limit cooperation between Germany and France. It is significant that the political classes and public opinion took initial steps to accept the participation of German forces in UN peace keeping operations. Nonetheless, German troops are prohibited to take part in military interventions and it is unlikely that German attitudes will evolve to match the French international security engagement.⁵

Germany's quest for stability explains in large part the country's policy of strong support for widening the European Union beyond the enlargement to Austria and the Nordic member states. Enlargement to the East would, in German eyes, enable the country to be surrounded on all sides by

⁵Philip Gordon, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance* (Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 90-92.

neighbors which derive their security from membership in European and transatlantic institutions.⁶ However, this policy of support for eastern enlargement is not supported to the same degree, or with the same intensity, by the French.⁷ This is one reason why cooperation between the two countries to provide a bilateral impetus to multilateral decisions on CFSP will be difficult.

Moreover, the inherent challenges of CFSP strategy formulation already existent in a Union of Twelve or Fifteen, create additional problems. These problems relate to the respective roles of member states and European institutions coupled with the interaction among the Union's three pillars, on the one hand, and CFSP decision making, on the other.⁸ The Maastricht Treaty envisaged a European Union with a single institutional framework in which COREPER, or the Committee of Permanent Representatives, would serve as *a filtre unique* through which all Union business would pass. COREPER is an institution of the Union, its competencies defined in Article 151 of the Treaty on European Union. However, its representatives belong to the national administrations of the member states. In the Treaty, COREPER was meant to function as a liaison between the European Community and CFSP pillars, or I and II, respectively, and to coordinate actions between pillars. In the European Political Cooperation (EPC) system, which preceded CFSP, the Political Directors, sitting in national foreign ministries, prepared EPC meetings of their foreign ministers. Despite the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, the influence of the Political Directors has remained strong and most resilient in the face of change. Since the Political Directors have an allegiance to their national ministries, it is not possible for them to perform the coordinating function of their COREPER counterparts, who sit in Brussels and gradually develop a sense of empathy in daily Council negotiations to reach common positions on European issues.

Even for an integrationist state like the Federal Republic of Germany, the relationship between these two bodies was tense in a Union of Twelve. As Ginsberg points out, this relationship “encapsulates the tug of war between contending approaches to EU decision making.”⁹ To what extent are national administrations, even those of integrationist-minded states with a long tradition of policy making within the European Community, likely to cede greater powers to central institutions of the Union in Brussels, i.e., COREPER? This question will undoubtedly increase in importance as the Union enlarges, thus placing greater pressure on a large and integration-oriented state like Germany to

⁶Christian Deubner, *Germany as Architect of European Integration and Eastern Europe* Working Paper 7.11 Center for German and European Studies (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, April 1996), pp. 16-20.

⁷Christian Deubner, *Frankreich in der Osterweiterung der EU, 1989 bis 1997* (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 1998).

⁸Roy H. Ginsberg, “The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy Retrospective On The First Eighteen Months,” in Cameron, Ginsberg, Janning and Mackintosh, *The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: Central Issues...Key Players*, pp. 40-44.

⁹Ibid., p. 41.

reconcile the tensions in its European policy making. Moreover, this same question brings out the sharp divide between integration and intergovernmentalism precisely because the gains and losses are, in reality and in the perception of some officials involved, largely zero-sum: a gain at the center is a loss of bureaucratic turf and influence back in national capitals.

Even with strong German political and economic support for enlargement, for the states most likely to accede to the European Union by 2006, namely, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Poland,¹⁰ the preceding question may pose an even greater challenge. Two initial reasons are cited to account for this fact. First, there is a serious lack of administrative training at home for national officials, particularly at the middle level which is crucial in the Union's system of negotiations. Second, these officials remain **relatively** inexperienced with the Union's institutional machinery despite the amount of PHARE funding invested to train officials from candidate countries in Union policy making.

In terms of CFSP decision making, Title V of the Maastricht Treaty allowed for the limited use of qualified majority voting (QMV), namely, in the implementation of joint actions, but for the most part actions were decided by consensus rule. For Germany, this disappointing result led the Kohl government to redouble its efforts, in spite of evident tensions with France under the leadership of Jacques Chirac, to make progress in the CFSP area in the follow-up to Maastricht.

Maastricht to Amsterdam: the Area of Conflict Prevention/Resolution and the Pact on Stability

Conflict Prevention/Resolution - The Petersberg Tasks

The initial experience with CFSP in the short time period after the German ratification of Maastricht on October 12, 1993 and the run-up to the 1996 Review Conference was disillusioning to the proponents of Maastricht. The French emphasis on the revival of Western European Union (WEU), which dates back to the 1980s, was consistent. However, the role of WEU as an instrument of CFSP within the Union linking a European security identity and policy with NATO did not materialize in a significant way. In order to accentuate the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), France pushed for the adoption of the Petersberg Doctrine by WEU member states in June 1992.¹¹ In this way, WEU armed forces could be used in situations which qualified as peacekeeping operations. At this time, NATO was redefining its mission as it sought a new role to play in post Cold War Europe. NATO showed a willingness to lend its armed forces and logistical support to peacekeeping

¹⁰The accession of Cyprus as one of the six first-round candidate countries remains an issue fraught with difficulties because of the division of the island and the tensions between Greece and Turkey over the island's political, economic and social situation.

¹¹Marek Kuberski, "Evolution of the French European Policy in the Domain of Security," in *Security of Poland in Changing Europe* (Warszawa-Torun: Marszalek, 1996), pp. 51-52.

operations placed under a United Nations and/or CSCE mandate.¹² Actions taken by WEU as Petersberg tasks fall into three main areas: humanitarian aid; peacekeeping operations and crisis management, including peacemaking operations.¹³ The Petersberg tasks, also defined as non-Article 5 tasks¹⁴, may be distinguished from the provisions of Article 5 operations in two ways. Participation in these operations is not obligatory. This same participation may include non-NATO or non-WEU member states.¹⁵

The inclusion of Petersberg Tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty in Article 17 (3) marks an evolutionary step for CFSP. France and Germany support the European Council as the main institution which sets the common strategy guidelines for the Western European Union in these matters. As specified in the Treaty, the General Affairs Council (GAC) of foreign ministers in agreement with the WEU decides upon the practical implementation of the Petersberg tasks so that all member states take part on an equal basis in planning and decision making.¹⁶ This result is in accord with a long-standing French goal to establish the primary role of the European Council and the GAC in CFSP in which the member states remain the decisive players. However, two key issues remain: the extent to which WEU as an institution accepts a status as an integral part of CFSP as the defense arm of the European Union; and the amount of resources the member states are willing to contribute to the CFSP budget to finance non-Article 5 operations. On both counts, there are evident difficulties. In the first case, institutional turf battles proliferate in the face of less than clearly stated responsibilities for most European security institutions. In the second, shrinking defense expenditures in most European countries are an ever present reality. Moreover, concerns among some member states about which funds support which actions from the European Community and CFSP budgets, respectively, are emerging as Pillars I and II increasingly interact.

The increasing significance of the Petersberg tasks in the CFSP framework is directly related to the next enlargement of the Union. As the first-round accession candidates align their policies closer to those of the Union over the next decade, their motivation to take on additional responsibilities

¹²Ibid., p. 52.

¹³Petersberg Declaration on Western European Union and European security, WEU Council, Bonn, June 19, 1992.

¹⁴Article 5 refers to the North Atlantic Treaty provision which deals with territorial self-defense and calls for action in cases of military aggression against an alliance member.

¹⁵Monika Wohlfeld, "Security," in *Costs, Benefits and Chances of Eastern Enlargement for the European Union* Bertelsmann Foundation Research Group on European Affairs (eds.) (Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 1998), p. 48.

¹⁶Franco Algieri, "Die Reform der GASP - Anleitung zu begrenztem gemeinsamem Handeln" in *Amsterdam in der Analyse* Werner Weidenfeld (Hrsg.) (Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 1998), p. 109.

within the CEE region could increase, particularly if an explicit link is maintained between good neighbor policies and Union membership. Wohlfeld describes this evolution in terms of these countries and their role as “security providers.”¹⁷ In this scenario, new EU members would be capable to contribute troops to European-led Petersberg operations, including “contributions to crisis prevention, management and peacekeeping efforts and to national and multinational formations answerable to the WEU such as the Eurocorps.”¹⁸ In realistic terms, however, this could only take place in the long-term given the need for additional infrastructure and training within the CEE countries, resources from the Union and the acquiescence of Russia.

Moreover, in the immediate future, more work has to be done on the Petersberg Tasks within a Union framework. Preparations have been left to the WEU with little impetus coming from the Presidency on behalf of the EU. The struggle is the institutional one mentioned previously as the WEU tries to ensure its own existence as it assumes responsibilities in this area. Furthermore, even in Petersberg Task operations it will be difficult to reach agreement among the 15 member states as France and the United Kingdom seek to retain their special roles rather than pool responsibilities.¹⁹

Another scenario, potentially destabilizing and conflict inducing in the short to medium term, concerns Hungary’s accession to NATO and the EU with both Romania and Slovakia relegated to the European and transatlantic periphery. Here it is important to consider that Hungarians are “arguably the most disaffected people in central and southeastern Europe.”²⁰ Ethnic Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia and Serbia represent a potential for nationalist conflict on demographic and historical grounds. An aging and declining population in Hungary coupled with a feeling that the Treaty of Trianon, which sizeably reduced Hungary’s territory, was unjust opens the door for demagogues and extremists to threaten central authority.²¹ Economic interdependence and the expectation of better living standards via EU and NATO accession provide no guarantees that the minority issue will fade away. Nor does Franco-German support of CEE candidate countries’ association with WEU and participation in peace keeping operations unless these efforts specifically

¹⁷Wohlfeld, p. 48.

¹⁸Ibid. The Eurocorps, which represents the embryo of a European army, is based in Strasbourg, France and consists of an initial 35,000 troops from France and Germany joined by additional troops from Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain.

¹⁹Interview, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, May 18, 1998.

²⁰Daniel N. Nelson, “Hungary and its Neighbors: Security and Ethnic Minorities,” *Central European Issues* Romanian Foreign Affairs Review Volume 3 Number 1 (1997): 93.

²¹Ibid.

address the minority issues in question.²² On the contrary, a new faultline of European security, based on economic and psychological insecurities, could well lead to a revival of past animosities, which decades of Communism merely suppressed.²³

In this context, the theoretical debate between neo-realism and interdependence overlooks the essential issues. Neo-realism fails to acknowledge the significance of domestic variables which in the European framework must be acknowledged as a factor of system change since 1989.²⁴ Interdependence overestimates the impact on the civil societies in the CEE countries of institutionalized links and the strength of economic variables. In the EU system, both these factors blur the lines between domestic and foreign policy and national and Union powers. However, it does not necessarily follow that either factor is strong enough to prevent conflict in the EU's neighboring regions during the short to medium term. This is due in large part to the distinctions which the Union's enlargement policies are establishing among the countries in these regions. A corollary is the Union's **perceived** distance from the security concerns of civil societies, particularly those in the candidate countries relegated to the second and third tiers of accession.

Given the sober analysis presented above, it is important to consider the role of the Pact on Stability and its successor, the Royaumont Initiative or the Process for Stability and Good Neighbourliness in South East Europe, as CFSP mechanisms in conflict prevention/resolution. Do these mechanisms allow the EU to function as an "anchor" through effective association and transformation in the CEE region?²⁵ Does the prospect of EU enlargement serve as an "incentive for reform" in the area of CFSP?²⁶ These questions are addressed prior to the conclusion which offers an assessment of

²²*Towards Association of the Countries of Central Europe With WEU*, "Address by Mr. Jean-Marie Caro, former President of the Assembly of WEU, at the seminar on WEU's point of view on the developments in Central and Eastern Europe," Warsaw, 11th and 12th February 1994 in Information letter from the Assembly of Western European Union, No. 17 (February 1994): 14-17.

²³Colette Mazzucelli, "A Separate Peace? Economic Stabilization-Development and the New Faultlines of European Security," in *Redefining European Security* Carl C. Hodge, ed. (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc, forthcoming).

²⁴Stanley Hoffmann, "Balance, Concert, Anarchy, or None of the Above," in *The Shape of the New Europe* Gregory F. Treverton, ed. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), pp. 197-98.

²⁵Barbara Lippert, "Relations with Central and Eastern European Countries: The Anchor Role of the European Union," in *Foreign Policy of the European Union* Elfriede Regelsberger, Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent and Wolfgang Wessels, eds. (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), p. 214.

²⁶Paul Luif, "Enlargement as a Challenge and Incentive for Reform," in *Foreign Policy of the European Union*, pp. 354-356.

CFSP in a Union of Twenty-One.

The Pact on Stability

In the aftermath of Maastricht, the French response to developments in German and European integration policies was an initiative rooted in its domestic politics and linked to ideas introduced by former Prime Minister and presidential candidate Edouard Balladur. It is possible to argue that one of the successes of CFSP has been Balladur's aim to establish a Pact on Stability which set up procedures to avoid conflict in central and eastern Europe. While it can be argued that the Pact, since its initiation in 1993, has promoted economic and political stability in the region, it is also true that this is an area in which CFSP can be expected to function best.²⁷

The Pact on Stability was concluded in Paris during the French Presidency of the European Union in March 1995. In a number of respects Balladur's project resembled that of Mitterrand's earlier proposal for a European Confederation. Although clearly an exercise in preventive diplomacy on a pan-European scale, another view of the project focused attention on France's aim to postpone further integration of central and eastern European countries into the European Union. Moreover, difficulties were evident from the start including the inability to ensure respect for the rule of law regarding contentious issues among those states concerned and the weakness of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to assure implementation of the principles defined in the Pact on Stability.²⁸

The French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alain Juppé, described the Pact on Stability in greater detail on February 4, 1995 during a working session in Munich. Emphasis was placed on the following points:

- France's highest priority on the development of a European identity in the field of defense and security, including the creation of an independent European satellite system, the further development of the Eurocorps and numerous bilateral contacts in air and rapid field reaction forces and a common European defense system including a nuclear deterrent.

- French approval of a fundamental role for the Atlantic Alliance in its continuing engagement to safeguard the security of the European continent. In France's perspective, NATO must nonetheless adapt to its new role in the area of peacekeeping. In this context, the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept must be implemented without the continued delay which, in French eyes, could be attributed to the difficulties in Bosnia. France views the practical implementation of CJTF and the use of WEU to create a European pillar of the Alliance as necessary initial steps in the creation of a European security and defense identity. The enlargement of NATO should not prevent its structural

²⁷Rummel, "The Foreign Policy of the EU," pp. 7-18.

²⁸Kuberski, "Evolution of the French European Policy in the Domain of Security," p. 57.

adaptation.

-France's concern for internal stability on the Continent connected with the accession of central and eastern European states to the European Union and associate partnership status for these states in WEU in connection with their eventual NATO membership. In the interim, the Partnership for Peace should be used to dispel fears of a new dividing line on the Continent. With regard to relations with Russia, the aim of French diplomacy is to develop a partnership with Russia which ensures respect for OSCE norms of behavior.

-French insistence on a concept of "enlarged security" which includes relations with its neighboring countries to the South, particularly given the increased threat from Islamic fundamentalism in the Maghreb states. France is especially vulnerable in terms of immigration from these countries. Therefore, a goal of French diplomacy is to create a Euro-Mediterranean dialogue which would also develop alongside that of the emerging relationships with Russia and countries to the East.²⁹

The inaugural conference of the Pact on Stability took place in Paris on 26 and 27 May 1994. The participants included the six associate members of the European Union, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria, and the three Baltic countries. In the conference conclusions, the stated objectives in the field of preventive diplomacy were to be achieved through the promotion of good neighborly relations and the organization of regional roundtables.³⁰

The Council's decision on 14 June 1994 regarding the continuation of the Pact on Stability joint action included complicated financial arrangements relating to the European Community's budget.³¹ Such complications would continue in the Royaumont Initiative, the successor process to the Pact on Stability. The Pact's final conference was held in Paris on 20-21 March 1995.

The Pact on Stability consists of a political declaration and about 100 bilateral agreements. Tangible results are notably the treaty between Hungary and Slovakia on the issue of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Slovakia.³² A treaty between Hungary and Romania addressing the sizeable Hungarian ethnic minority living in Transylvania was signed on 16 September 1996, almost a year and a half

²⁹At the Cannes European Council in June 1995, a decision was taken to give 4.7 million ECU to the European Union's Mediterranean partners. Kuberski, "Evolution of the French European Policy in the Domain of Security," pp. 57-60.

³⁰Paul Luif, *On the Road to Brussels* (Vienna: Braumüller, 1995), p. 70.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid.

after the Paris conference.³³

The Royaumont Initiative

In the aftermath of the French Presidency of the European Union, the question remained as to the future implementation of the Pact on Stability. In the words of one official, the French idea was lacking in practice.³⁴ Moreover, there was the concern that in practice, the Pact on Stability was an unwanted child. Attempts to pass the idea and the practice on from the EU to the OSCE did not entirely succeed.³⁵

The Pact on Stability did promise regional cooperation and confidence building. The initial difficulty was in large part in the funding requirements. Normally funding for non-member countries is provided for in the PHARE program with projects for the member states financed by structural funds. Therefore, an additional requirement in the Pact on Stability was to find support for so-called “mixed projects” through PHARE funding. There was also a need for a more permanent structure for the Pact, which the member states initially tried to avoid acknowledging.³⁶

During the General Affairs Council meeting on 26-27 February 1996, a platform for the development of a “process of stability and good neighbourliness in South East Europe” was elaborated.³⁷ This process was a direct result of the French initiative inaugurated at the Royaumont meeting of 13 December 1995. The initiative is therefore linked to the peace process in the former Yugoslavia.

The Royaumont Process strives to accomplish three main goals: to strengthen stability and good neighbour relations through the reduction of tensions resulting from the conflict in the former Yugoslavia; to promote better understanding thus contributing to a restoration of confidence and dialogue among South East European countries; and overcoming ethnic divisions and hatreds. The overall aim to put in place a process of cooperation among peoples in the region to reinforce the peace plan. All states in the region are represented on an equal footing, including the former

³³Pál Dunay, “Hungarian-Romanian relations: a changed paradigm?,” in *The Effects of Enlargement on Bilateral Relations in Central and Eastern Europe* Monika Wohlfeld, ed. Chaillot Paper 26 (Paris: The Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union, June 1997), pp. 6-7.

³⁴Interview, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Geographical Affairs II, May 14, 1998.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷“Report from the Commission to the Council on Regional Cooperation in Europe,” European Commission, 741/97 (English), December 1, 1997, Annex 1.

republic of Yugoslavia. The Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman in Office reports on “the progress in implementing the arms control provisions of Annex 1B of the Dayton/Paris Accords on a regular basis.”³⁸

It is important to bear in mind that the Royaumont Process is meant to engage the civil societies of the countries involved. Projects and/or programmes selected for inclusion in the Royaumont Process are evaluated on the basis of their suitability to meet the criteria of good neighbourliness and regional stability. Priority is therefore accorded to regional and cross-border initiatives conducted by and geared towards a number of different groups in the region to develop and bring groups in civil societies closer together.³⁹

In its decision of 28 November 1997, the Council of the European Union appointed Dr. Pan Roumeliotis, a Greek national, as the coordinator of the Royaumont Process. This step marks the Union’s continued involvement in the process alongside that of OSCE. As coordinator, Dr. Roumeliotis has several tasks. Among the most important are 1. the preparation of Process follow-up meetings in collaboration with the Presidency of the Council and 2. the organization, in cooperation with diplomatic representations to the Union of participants in the Process and the European Commission, of contacts in those countries. The goal in this context is to discuss options arising from the Process with the representatives of governments, civil society and NGOs.

In terms of a timetable for the coordinator’s work during the first six months of 1998, several priorities stood out. A significant meeting took place in Athens on 1 April to examine proposed projects and to assess their feasibility and the arrangements for their implementation. Dr. Roumeliotis reported on the willingness of Luxembourg to fund the project on “promoting positive messages through the media.” Greece and the Netherlands expressed a potential interest in projects on “developing a network of young south east European leaders” and a “workshop on reporting ethnic minorities and ethnic conflict,” respectively. The importance for participants, particularly countries in the region, to present “viable, well-targeted cross-border project proposals” was underscored.⁴⁰

Other priority tasks for the Royaumont Process coordinator are 1. to organize of a “contact point” for the European Union, governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations from EU member states and those taking part in the Process; 2. to visit south east European countries taking part in the Process and “initiate dialogue with representatives of the

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Council Decision of 27 October 1997 on the adoption of the terms of reference of the Royaumont Process coordinator (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 1997), p. 1.

⁴⁰“Process on Stability and Good Neighbourliness in South East Europe,” Chairman’s Summary, Athens, 31 March-1 April 1998, p. 3.

governmental organizations, civil society and NGOs, while respecting the latter's diversity and specificity;" 3. to set up a data base on the projects and programmes, NGOs, initiatives, etc., relating to south east Europe with the assistance of the European Commission.

The initial meetings undertaken by Dr. Roumeliotis in various cities within the region during February and March 1998 revealed that the contribution of countries of the region to the overall process of European security depends on their internal developments and efforts towards democracy and the implementation of a European regional policy for stability and good neighbourliness. Clearly certain countries, like Bulgaria, were hardly informed about the aims and principles of the Royaumont Process. In other cases, it was evident that local NGOs were less experienced with cross-border programmes. In contrast, visits to Zagreb and Ljubljana revealed evidence of a willingness and a readiness in Croatia and Slovenia to take part constructively in the Royaumont Process. The Slovenian NGOs, in particular, could provide the Royaumont Coordinator with important cross-border project proposals in the short-term.⁴¹

The initiative taken to establish and implement the Royaumont Process offers additional empirical evidence about the roles of France and Germany within CFSP in the context of the challenge of enlargement. First, the institutional turf battles which abound in the field of European security waste energy and resources in the face of the real challenge, which the Bosnian and other actual or potential Balkan conflicts, represents. In the words of Richard Holbrooke, "success or failure in Bosnia will be the critical determinant of NATO's future, far more than NATO's enlargement in the next phase."⁴² France and Germany struggle to work together in face of the Balkan tragedy, but their own differences limit their ability to shape a European contribution using CFSP.

Second, the large and diverse number of countries involved in the Royaumont Process complicates the dissemination of information, which may account for the uneven knowledge about the Process among its participants. One of its main goals, the facilitation of cross-border programmes to build civil society, encounters difficulties from the start given the lack of experience and suspicion of countries in the region regarding these types of transnational contacts. One country which is able to facilitate transnational contacts and therefore benefit from the Royaumont Process, Slovenia, enjoys a relatively advantageous economic and security position independently on its own. The impact of the Royaumont Process on countries in crisis, particularly as conflict influences their civil societies, is less evident. In this context, the contributions which France and Germany could make to strengthen CFSP as the Union enlarges depend on an ability to view CFSP as more than just a mechanism of classical foreign policy among sovereign states. This implies a sea change in attitude

⁴¹Interview, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Geographical Affairs II, May 14, 1998.

⁴²Richard C. Holbrooke, "The Bosnian Lesson," in *The New Europe - Strategies for Differentiated Integration* Bertelsmann Foundation, ed. (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1997), p. 108.

towards CFSP which is not apparent among French policy makers.

Third, in the region in question, it is difficult to argue that the state is the primary source of identity; ethnic groupings have a greater impact on the popular consciousness. It is clear that Europe cannot yet provide the diverse peoples there with a sense of identity, but in the longer term, it is the potential of European cohesion which may contribute more to security broadly defined. In this part of Europe, where loyalties are constantly shifting, the role of outside actors like the United States and Russia is essential to provide additional material resources and the perspective of countries acting from the outside looking in. It is possible that the United States from its vantage point is more able to take “a distanced view of close things” in a region where emotions run high. The involvement of Russia also addresses that country’s security needs given its geographical proximity to the region, albeit in a different context than that of recent decades. Here the contributions made by France and Germany to strengthen CFSP in a wider geographical context depend on each country’s willingness to work together while acknowledging that although Europe is no longer “between the superpowers,” there is still an “enduring balance” to be maintained. This balance requires both an American and a Russian presence.

***Flexibility and Strategies for Differentiated Integration in CFSP,
Sharper and Larger?***

France and Germany advocated the use of constructive abstention throughout the Amsterdam process as a means to promote flexibility in the area of CFSP and to allow coalitions of the willing to emerge by getting around the consensus requirement. Even if the abstention principle is rarely used in practice, the knowledge of its existence among negotiators at the table may force greater consensus on CFSP issues. It is evident that the Union is trying to reconcile goals which are in a constant state of tension. Specifically, how does CFSP become sharper in profile and effectiveness as the Union becomes larger?

One way would be to limit the use of the veto in CFSP and encourage more majority voting among the member states. However, given the staunch resistance of a number of countries to a change from unanimity to QMV in CFSP, particularly the United Kingdom and Greece, it is necessary to question whether it promotes the integration process to insist on this change during each set of intergovernmental conference (IGC) negotiations.

Another way to promote a sharper profile and more effectiveness would be to enable CFSP to anchor countries in central and eastern Europe in a way which the European Community strives to accomplish using economic instruments. In this regard, a number of scholars have written about the role played by EU economic aid to the countries of central and eastern Europe (CEE). However, viewed from the CEE countries the structural dialogue, initiated to bring these countries closer to the Union prior to actual accession, represents at times a series of “structural monologues” which are

exhausting in practice and not beneficial to either side.⁴³ While economic assistance from the Union does promote closer links and habits of cooperation among some of the countries in the region, it relegates others to the periphery. Moreover, initial assessments of the changes in CFSP, notably in the area of conflict prevention, and the early success of the Pact on Stability, indicate that even with a strong Franco-German line CFSP cannot get beyond self-imposed restrictions like the consensus rule and the compartmentalization of the Union's foreign policy process.

Is there an incentive to view enlargement as a means of reforming CFSP? In the context of enlargement, there is the potential for change to occur on institutional questions. The Amsterdam process, while it reached no definitive conclusions on institutional issues, did leave open the possibility of a future compromise.⁴⁴ However, as these institutional changes take place, there may be an even greater incentive for member states, present and future, to hold on to one remaining bastion of national power in what is clearly defined as a zero-sum game by national elites. This *domain réservé* is perceived by some Union member states as the policy area which falls under the rubric of CFSP.

Defining the Common Foreign and Security Policy in a Union of Twenty-One

In the context of the next enlargement, there is also the issue of an unwillingness, after decades under Communist rule, for candidate countries to relinquish newly acquired national competencies to an increasingly centralized institutional apparatus within the Council structure. This centralization is one result as intergovernmental negotiations give way to integrationist policies across a wider spectrum of policies and as the dividing lines among the pillars continue to change.⁴⁵ In light of the Amsterdam Treaty, witness the potential evolution in this direction regarding Third Pillar issues

⁴³Colette Mazzucelli, *The Future of the European Union and Implications for European-American Cooperation: An Interview with Secretary General Jürgen Trumpf, Parliamentary State Secretary István Szent-Iványi and Ambassador Carlos Westendorp* **ECSA Review** IX, 3 (Fall 1996): 15.

⁴⁴Interview, Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the European Union, May 20, 1998.

⁴⁵Andrew Moravcsik refers to the simultaneous processes of centralization and fragmentation as Europe confronts "the challenges of deepening, diversity and democracy." Andrew Moravcsik, "Centralization and Fragmentation? Europe before the Challenges of Deepening, Diversity and Democracy," in *Centralization and Fragmentation? Europe before the Challenges of Deepening, Diversity and Democracy* Andrew Moravcsik, ed. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, forthcoming.)

which define the Union's internal security agenda.⁴⁶

Given the fact that the next enlargement is not likely to happen before 2005, and that it is likely to be limited to 5 or 6 countries, it is important to consider a number of factors which could influence French and German contributions to the evolution of CFSP as membership in the Union increases. First, in spite of Franco-German contributions, the CFSP may remain unambitious in terms of joint actions owing to: 1. the inability, on the one hand, of certain member states like France to reconcile sovereignty in this area with interdependence in monetary affairs; 2. shrinking defense budgets in both France and Germany which are not accompanied by an increased pooling of resources among European countries in the military sphere; and 3. the habit of traditional reliance on the United States to play a decisive role on the Continent in situations which require a military engagement, particularly in the case of the Federal Republic owing to its own domestic constraints in this area.

In this scenario, participation for CEE countries in CFSP is "enormously attractive and potentially less painful in the short-term than full exposure to the EC pillar."⁴⁷ Actions in the area of conflict prevention and the continuation of the Royaumont Process would remain the measure of success. However, in this case, the prospect of enlargement also aggravates an already difficult situation as the Union struggles to assert itself as "an international actor"⁴⁸ and limit the gap Hill describes between its "capability" and "expectations."

In the more optimistic scenario, the changes introduced by the Euro in EMU, coupled with a strong multilateral convergence around a clear Franco-German line on CFSP, may lead to forward progress in decision-making and increased capability for joint actions, qualitatively and quantitatively. In this scenario, the compartmentalization of foreign policy in the Union would give way to increased interaction among the economic, diplomatic and military instruments of policy making. A European identity would emerge defined as much by CFSP as by EMU. This identity would complement and reinforce NATO's engagement in Europe. Here enlargement would take place in the context of a stronger CFSP within a more cohesive Union. However, in this case, a number of fundamental

⁴⁶Colette Mazzucelli, "Analyzing Decision Making during the Intergovernmental Conference Process: Maastricht and Amsterdam," Paper Presented on the Panel "Analyzing Decision Making in the European Union," Eleventh International Conference of Europeanists, Baltimore, Maryland, 26-28 February 1998, pp. 24-29.

⁴⁷David Allen, "Wider but Weaker or the More the Merrier? Enlargement and Foreign Policy Cooperation in the EC/EU," in *The Expanding European Union: Past, Present and Future* John Redmond and Glenda G. Rosenthal, eds. (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), p. 123.

⁴⁸Reinhardt Rummel. with the assistance of Colette Mazzucelli. *The Evolution of an International Actor: Western Europe's New Assertiveness* (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1990.)

obstacles would have to be overcome, including changes in: 1. mentality about the meaning of sovereignty in older member states; 2. the meaning of neutrality in former EFTA countries which joined the Union in 1995; and 3. the potential to reduce conflicts among countries in the center and east of the Continent whose identity is increasingly defined in terms of the Union's evolution.