INTRODUCTION

This talk looks at the emerging American policy toward the countries of central and eastern Europe in terms of three dimensions: politico-military, internal security and socio-economic. Each dimension is explored in turn. These remarks are followed by some observations on the sigificance of American policy in the region for the on-going dialogue between the European Union and the United States of America since the signing of the Transatlantic Declaration on 23 November 1990 and, more recently, the talks among US President Bill Clinton, German Chancellor and current EU Council President Helmut Kohl and Commission President Jacques Delors during the Berlin Summit in mid-July 1994. My remarks are limited to about 45 minutes so as to encourage an exchange of views about transatlantic relations among members of civil society during a most difficult transition period for both continents.

I. THE POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION: PRESIDENT CLINTON'S INITIATIVE - THE "PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE" (PFP)

This initiative, which dates back to the January 1994 Brussels Summit, envisages joint field exercises in peacekeeping among members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that are able and willing to participate. The idea behind the Clinton initiative was to offer the central and east European countries the chance to adapt their military forces to the requirements of the integrated command structure of the Atlantic Alliance. For certain countries, notably Poland, the proposal was "an insufficient step in the right direction." (1) The Clinton Administration's main concern, as explained by senior State Department official and Russia expert Strobe Talbott, and shared by France, moreover, was to avoid isolating Russia. The precarious position of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and the increasing popularity of nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky, fueled American concerns. At the time, it seemed that the United States was more reluctant to consider a timetable for entry of new members to NATO than other Western European countries like Great Britain. For example, whereas President Clinton said that the "Partnership for Peace" would "advance a process of evolution for NATO's formal enlargement," Mr. John Major, in a distinct difference of nuance, said it "could" lead to the admission of new members. (2)

Concrete objectives of the "Partnership for Peace" are not well understood by the majority of the American public. These include facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes; ensuring democratic control of defence forces; maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE; the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations and others as may be subsequently be agreed; the development over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance. (3)

INITIAL RESULTS DURING 1994

The implementation of the "Partnership for Peace" procedure began with the signature of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document by each participant. The next step is the submission by each partner of a Presentation Document to NATO indicating the scope, pace and level of participation in cooperation activities with NATO sought by the partner (for example, joint planning, training and exercises). To facilitate cooperation activities, NACC partner countries and other PFP participating states are invited to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell in Mons, Belgium, where the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is also located. The Partnership Coordination Cell is responsible, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, for coordinating joint military activities within the Partnership for Peace and for carrying out the military planning necessary to implement Partnership Programmes between NATO and individual PFP partners. (4)

Until present twenty-three countries outside NATO have participated in joint military exercises and other activities alongside members of the Atlantic Alliance in the framework of "Partnership for Peace". Since January three military exercises have taken place. The first was in Poland, the second was a navel exercise and the third was held in the Netherlands. These exercises are establishing patterns of cooperation among all the associated countries. This is an important goal in itself. However, the essential goal is to prepare these countries for eventual membership according to a schedule yet to be determined. Prudence remains the key word to underline when speaking of the expansion of NATO. At present lists for next year's joint military exercises are being drawn up including bilateral or trilateral manoeuvres like those among Germany, Denmark and Poland. (5)

THE NEW CONTEXT SINCE BRUSSELS

During a NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels on 1-2 December 1994, the Russian foreign minister, Andrei V. Kozyrev, rejected a new study that considers the eastward expansion of the Atlantic Alliance. (6) The NATO foreign ministers, in their endorsement of the US proposal to set up a yearlong study on practical conditions for new membership, did not name the leading candidates for admission - generally thought to be Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic - or set any target dates. Instead, the proposal was to focus on such practical questions as nuclear implications and costs of expansion. Part of the caution reflected concern about Russian hostility to enlargement. The day before Russia had made a sweeping counteroffer of closer ties to the Western European Union (WEU), the future defence arm of the European Union. Although the other NATO foreign ministers consented to the American initiative, French Foreign Minister Alain Jupp‚ expressed reservations, reportedly saying during a meeting that "we should avoid premature enlargement that gives the impression that we seek a redivision of the European continent." (7)

There are certain countries in central Europe, Lithuania among them, which have made it their clear objective to integrate into the Atlantic Alliance as soon as possible. At present only a gradual enlargement of NATO can be envisaged for those countries not yet ready to become full fledged members of the Alliance. However, these countries do have a need for "political and psychological reassurance" - something they cannot create by themselves. The State Secretary in Lithuania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Albinas Januska, wrote in an article published the same day as the Brussels meeting: "This is what these countries need now. Some mechanism to enhance PFP, to empower the governments of the new democracies to build security from the inside. As each country of central Europe improves its own national security with NATO's help, it will advance the security of the whole region and ease tensions between nations." (8)

It is necessary to acknowledge a growing tendency among Europeans to take a difference view of their own security than the Americans since the end of the cold war. The war in Bosnia is significant in this regard. The American proposal favord by some in the Congress, notably Senators Dole and Gingrich, to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims and to prepare for all-out air strikes against Serbian military installations, is generally not shared by England, France or Germany. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel expressed the European view when he spoke out clearly against the removal of European forces under UN command prior to lifting the arms embargo. (9) It is also necessary to emphasize, however, there are differences of opinion within the American Congress as well on this issue with Senators McCain and Warner warning against air strikes. Mr. McCain has stated: "I don't believe in the efficacy of air strikes unless you are willing to bomb in such a massive fashion that would incur significant civilian casualties." Both McCain and Warner believe that "air strikes alone would do nothing." Massive numbers of ground troops would be necessary to be effective and "the American people aren't willing to do that," according to McCain. (10)

It is also true that the Republicans were swept into majority positions in both Houses of Congress by the American people in order to address troubling domestic issues, not to make foreign policy for the American President. (11) Mr. Clinton's difficulties in holding a firm policy course on Bosnia are problematic for Europeans and Americans, but for quite different reasons. The Europeans wonder about his competence to execute American policy in Bosnia. The Americans, who also bemoan a "lack of strategy and will," now openly criticize him for joining the allies in the politics of appeasement. (12)

The disaccord within the Atlantic Alliance over Bosnia has made the Europeans reluctant to endorse plans for Alliance expansion. Moreover, the situation in Bosnia has also lead some Americans to ask the question: "If NATO won't save Bosnia, why would it save central Europeans?" (13) Attempts to justify the expansion of NATO eastward must first consider the goals or intentions of an American presence in Europe. Specifically, is the American presence on the European Continent illustrative of some universal mission of leadership as, for example, under the Bush Presidency. Or is the American presence in Europe a necessary component of "stability maintenance" there given the unstable situation in Russia and the resistance at the levels of elite and public opinion to European integration as outlined in the Maastricht Treaty.

The recent meeting of the 53 member states of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe indicated the divergence of views between the Russians and the Western allies. Mr. Yeltsin's question to the CSCE leaders, "Why are you sowing the seeds of mistrust?" can also be applied to some of Mr. Zhirinovsky's past remarks. Some of his comments on Austria, for example, provoked strong reactions in the United States. Americans, including myself, read articles in which Zhirinovsky stated that there was no need for Austria to exist. (14) Since this country will soon be a member of the European Union, remarks such as these have implications for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Union as a whole. Some persons may argue that NATO's expansion draws a new dividing line in Europe, but Mr. Zhirinovsky's plans are clearly stated intentions to redraw the map of Europe. If viewed in this light, the arguement has been made that NATO remains in the interest of America and Europe because it addresses two fundamental tasks: first, its classic role: to defend its members against a new threat from the east, should this occur. Instability in Russia is due in large part to tragic economic conditions and insufficient food for its people, rampant crime and a psychological reaction to freedom after so many years under Communist rule. The expansion of NATO, and the exclusion of Russia, may well be used by Mr. Zhirinovsky to play on populist sentiment. But it is questionable to argue that NATO's expansion will be the determining factor in the evolution of Russian domestic politics. (15)

The second function of NATO is to guarantee the security of its internal as well as its external frontiers, assuring the peaceful conduct of its own members. This is a role extremely valuable to Russia, as well as to the United States, Western Europe and the central and eastern European countries asking for NATO membership. Threats to peace born of the instability accompanying ethnic nationalism in the region concern Russia's western border. (16) The task of American officials in the coming months is to explain that widening NATO will advance Russia's goal of stability in central Europe. While seeking to narrow differences in upcoming talks in Moscow, American officials also intend to make clear that Washington is firmly committed to expanding NATO. (17)

Clearly the expansion of the Atlantic Alliance has tremendous implications for the emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. One of Poland's initial goals in seeking ties to the European Union was its fear of renewed Russian nationalism and the possibility to participate in the Common Foreign and Security Policy. (18) A Franco-German initiative, dating back to November 1993, offered Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, a special status in the Western European Union in order to address these fears. In spite of the differences between the United States and Europe over Bosnia, Washington favors a stronger, more coherent foreign and security policy for the Union. This includes a greater military role for Europe by bolstering the Western European Union. (19) Franco-German efforts to create and expand the membership of the Eurocorps and the recent Anglo-French accord on joint military cooperation are efforts in the direction of a European defence identity. This is a theme which Prime Minister Edouard Balladur picked up on when he proposed a "European army" in the context of Atlantic solidarity during his address on 7 December before the National Assembly. (20) It remains to be seen whether French politicians can achieve this objective in a concrete way that transcends mere presidential campaign rhetoric.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF RECENT CHANGES IN EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

The United States supports the elaboration of a Common Foreign and Security Policy for the European Union. In addition to the working groups set up by the Berlin Summit on relations with central and eastern Europe and Third Pillar issues, a third working group on the common foreign and security policy has also been formed consisting of United States and European Union representatives. Yet, as United States Ambasador to the European Union, Stuart Eizenstat, recently explained in a talk in Warsaw, the CFSP is going to be "a source of frustration" on both sides for years to come. This is due in part to the fact that member states of the Union are reluctant to sacrifice their independence. Both the Americans and the Europeans are also in a state of transition. Most difficult for the Americans is the fact that the Union does not yet have the institutional framework to make the Common Foreign and Security Policy a reality. There is no military enforcement mechanism and the relationship between the Western European Union and the European Union remains unsettled. (21)

However, the American Ambassador also cited observable, positive changes since Maastricht including constant communication and interaction among the foreign ministers of the Twelve countries. The United States has found, however, that on a crisis issue like Bosnia, the European Union is still not quite able to take the leadership. This makes the United States presence on the Continent essential. (22) Furthermore, it is necessary in the context of the CFSP that the United States and the European Union work together to assure a parallel process of membership for the countries of central and eastern Europe in the European Union and NATO within the next decade. (23) But the real challenges of the eastern enlargement of the European Union are not military issues as much as legal and economic ones.

II. THE DIMENSION OF INTERNAL SECURITY THE BERLIN SUMMIT INITIATIVE

During their meeting on 12 July, under the German Presidency of the Council of Ministers, President Clinton, Chancellor Kohl and President Delors affirmed their comittment to increase the cooperation between the United States of America and the European Union in order to fight organized crime and drug-trafficking. Agreement was reached to set up a working group in this area including representatives of the United States, the Presidency of the Council, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers Secretariat. Since 1 November 1993, which marked the coming into force of the Treaty on European Union, the fight against organized crime and drug trafficking is formally included in the so-called Third Pillar of the Maastricht Treaty. This pillar is largely intergovernmental cooperation with the eventual possibility to transfer some, if not all, of its competences to the acquis communautaire, or First Pillar, if all of the member states vote unanimously to do so. Unfortunately, at present, little progress has been made in the Third Pillar due to the resistance of French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua to any additional delegation of sovereignty to the European institutions. (24) The implications of this European disaccord on the Euro-American dialogue on Third Pillar issues is a strong one.

Despite French resistance, the European Union's enlargement strategy to the east, adopted at the European Council in Essen, includes closer cooperation by holding semi-annual meetings among the ministers of the interior and justice in six countries, the Visegrad Four plus Romania and Bulgaria, and their counterparts in the European Union member states. This cooperation is very important in terms of any eventual enlargement of the Union because problems involving crime and drugs are spreading rapidly to the east. Public perceptions of the central and eastern countries in the Union member states are influenced by articles depicting the role of the mafia in the east and a large number of illegal activities there. Moreover, participation by the central and eastern European ministers alongside their Union counterparts in negotiating sessions of the Interior and Justice Affairs Council is an excellent exercise to give potential member states an idea of the working methods within the Union institutions.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION ON THIRD PILLAR ISSUES

Since the signing of the Transatlantic Declaration on 23 November 1990, the United States of America and European Union have begun a process of closer cooperation with the aim of assisting the countries of central and eastern Europe. In the area of Third Pillar issues, the desire for mutual cooperation has been most evident in the fight against organized crime. The danger posed by the Mafia in Russia is a concern for both continents. The first meeting of the working group agreed to during the Berlin Summit took place on 2 December. The United States' representatives presented several papers about work on areas within the Third Pillar competences in the United States. The Council Secretariat now has the task of translating all the documents presented by the Americans in the eleven official languages of the European Union (French, German, Italian, Dutch, English, Danish, Greek, Spanish, Portuguese, Swedish and Finnish). It must then distribute all the translated documents to the Union member states in order to get their comments and reactions. It would be preferable to have a response from the European Union on the American working documents prior to the next European Union-United States Summit. However, it is not certain that there will be enough time to obtain both the translations and the reactions of all the Union member states in time for a more in-depth discussion in June 1995. (25) Moreover, discussions between both sides will be more difficult if the Union does not resolve its own internal differences on Third Pillar issues, particularly with regard to the creation of what has potential to be a "European FBI". (26) In this regard, President Mitterrand has affirmed France's obligation under the Maastricht Treaty to participate constructively in the work of Europol. The French President has assured the German Presidency that an agreement will be reached prior to the European Council in Cannes in June 1995.

III. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (G-24)- AMERICAN PARTICIPATION

With regard to multilateral economic assistance to the countries of central and eastern Europe, in 1989 the European Commission assumed the responsibility to coordinate this aid in the context of the G-24. Initially, assistance was channeled to Poland and Hungary. However, ten more countries have been added since that time including the Baltic States, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Slovenia and Macedonia. Croatia was included in this group, but its aid was suspended due to the war in the former Yugoslavia. It will most likely be readmitted into this group of aid recipients in the future. In terms of a collective effort, that exists alongside bilateral aid programs by each of the member states, the European Union has its PHARE program of assistance to the countries of central and eastern Europe. The United States has a program of bilateral assistance in the form of Support for Emerging European Democracies (SEED) monies. In the five year period from 1990-1995 almost $2 billion in SEED funds have been earmarked for the countries in the region.

PHARE and SEED are just two of about twenty or so programs coordinated by the European Commission for the G-24 and international financial institutions. The major portion of early aid was in the form of macro financial assistance to help individual countries with their balance of payments accounts. As the process of reform deepened to a structural level, sectoral assistance working groups were formed in such areas as transport, agriculture, nuclear safety and democratic institutions. Although it made sense to handle some issues like transport on a horizontal basis, due to obvious geographical links among countries in the region, eventually many of the horizontal groups were disbanded in spring 1993. Discussions were thereafter treated on country by country basis.

EUROPEAN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES SINCE THE MEETING OF CLINTON, KOHL AND DELORS

In the wake of the Berlin Summit, a US-EU study group has been formed to work on joint initiatives toward the countries of central and eastern Europe. A paper produced on behalf this study group was presented in the General Affairs Council of the EU Foreign Ministers on 19 December. The proposals with the greatest potential are those in the trade area, for instance the development of harmonized lower tarrifs by the EU and US toward the central and eastern European countries. However, there is general agreement among practitioners that more meat is needed on the bones of these proposals which rest quite general in nature. On the European side, there is some concern that the Americans may want a seat at the table as the European Union develops its policies toward the central and eastern European countries.

In addition to the US-EU study group, there has been some overlap between the economic assistance process in the context of the G-24 and the United States-European Commission ad hoc coordination process. The latter process takes place on a country by country basis. The initial US-European Commission emphasis has been on Poland. The idea is to make the assistance programs complimentary to one another. Three senior level meetings have already taken place. The aim of the Clinton Administration is to build an edifice of regional assistance, beginning in Poland, and to establish a US-EU dialogue of cooperation in this area. In spite of the fact that academic observers have commented on the increased links between economics and security issues, there is no overlap between the activities taking place in the "Partnership for Peace" and those occurring as a result of either G-24 multilateral assistance or the ad hoc US-EU coordination. (27)

IV. WORKING RESULTS IN THREE DIMENSIONS - THE "BALANCE SHEET"

The approach of one of the Founding Fathers of the European Community, Jean Monnet, was to make a "balance sheet" of positive and negative circumstances before deciding on a precise action or strategy. (28) In terms of the politico-military dimension, the balance sheet is quite mixed. Concrete steps have been taken to offer central and east European countries security guarantees by the United States, primarily, though not exclusively, in the military sphere, and by the European Union in the form of potential membership. Yet, differences over policy in Bosnia threaten to spill over into divergences on NATO's expansion study. How to assuage Russian fears of a security threat due to an expanded NATO, and to emphasize instead a stable Western border for Russia, remains the immediate task for the Clinton Administration.

On Third Pillar issues, the balance sheet on EU-US cooperation is rather hard to evaluate. On the one hand, the Essen European Council has approved its enlargement strategy including greater cooperation on interior and justice issues. On the other, some member states remain jealous of their sovereign rights in these areas. This fact has an enormous impact on the dialogue between the two continents. There is little chance that the French Presidency of the Council of Ministers will advance many Third Pillar dossiers. After the French Presidency, the Spanish one will be charged with the preparations for the intergovernmental conference in 1996. It is possible that some progress may be made in efforts between the US and the EU in the fight against organized crime. But this cooperation will be more ad hoc with few strategic goals and, therefore, perhaps not always well coordinated.

In so far as socio-economic issues are concerned, the balance sheet on the European Union-United States dialogue is also mixed. In spite of their joint interests and will to assist the countries in the region, differences of opinion exist between the United States and the European Union on market access for eastern European exports of steel, farm products and textiles to the European Union. (29) The reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, which must be considered prior to any eastern enlargement of the European Union, is also an area of disagreement. Agriculture is a particularly sensitive issue in countries like France and Poland because many people identify it with a way of life which they feel is threatened.

It is true, on the other hand, that the United States has ratified the GATT/WTO Treaty and the European Union and its member states are expected to do the same. However, the stakes have been raised as both political parties in the United States, Republicans and Democrats, prepare for the 1996 presidential elections. (30) A political battle is emerging for the middle class vote. This is a contest among presidential contenders for voters who feel their jobs may be lost in a more open world trading system. In spite of these difficulties, the task for the United States and the European Union vis-...-vis the countries of central and eastern Europe remains cooperation within the larger context of world trade. This cooperation may not be so evident or so forthcoming despite an improvement in economies on both side of the Atlantic. Unemployment remains a serious factor of discontent in Europe especially among the young.

V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION-UNITED STATES DIALOGUE WITH CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE ON THE EVE OF THE FRENCH PRESIDENCY

The American presence on the European Continent remains a necessary factor for stability, but it is important to view this presence in light of developments in the direction of a European defence identity. This is beginning to take shape with the Western European Union as the European pillar of NATO and the Eurocorps as the embryo of a European army. At present it is important and necessary to consider the future tasks of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and to acknowledge that as it is being elaborated the Atlantic Alliance serves the interests of stability maintenance. Renewed American sentiments of isolationism make it necessary to demonstrate the it is in the American and the European interests, both East and West, that the Alliance expand with objectives that include the preservation of Russia's Western frontier. (31) The Alliance must work with Russia to demonstrate that the eastward expansion of NATO, like that of the European Union, is part of the economic and political development of central and eastern European countries. (32)

As the European Union moves toward a single currency with renewed political will, (33) it is in the United States interest, as well as the interest of the international trading system as a whole, that the central and eastern European countries gradually integrate into the Union with all of the responsibilities and rights that this integration entails. A huge first step, which the United States supports, is the Union's eastern strategy for acceptance of the economic and legal norms of the internal market by the countries in central and eastern Europe.

The Berlin Summit initiative illustrates that in several areas like relations with the central and east Europeans, Third Pillar issues and the CFSP, there is the will to make the European-American dialogue an on-going and constructive one. This requires not only the will of governments, but accord among civil societies whose members are also in dialogue with one another. In this context, it must be said that some of the journalistic reporting on the European Union is not the most accurate or complete. This can be and often is confusing or misleading for citizens trying to understand events in the Union. At the government level, proposals are currently under discussion to set up additional working groups, representing the European Union and the United States, in other areas of potential cooperation toward the countries of central and eastern Europe, for example, in trade and transport. In early January 1995, German government officials will bring the work already accomplished on the European Union-United States dialogue to their counterparts in Paris. It falls to the French Presidency of the Council of Ministers to continue to build on this initial effort.

NOTES

* This text is a revised version of a talk given by the author at the Toulouse Law School for the USIS Speakers Program on 12 December 1994.

(1) Christopher Bobinski, "Clinton plan fails to allay Polish fears," Financial Times, January 11, 1994, 3.

(2) "NATO's unequal Partnership for Peace," Financial Times, January 11, 1994, 3.

(3) Partnership for Peace, Basic Fact Sheet, NATO Office of Information and Press, June 1994, No 9, 2.

(4) Ibid, 3.

(5) Interview, US Embassy, Bonn, 22 November 1994.

(6) "Russia Balks Over NATO Expansion to the East," International Herald Tribune, December 2, 1994, 1.

(7) Ibid, 1 & 7.

(8) Albinas Januska, "NATO, Tell Us What You Want," The Wall Street Journal Europe, December 2-3, 1994, 6.

(9) Craig R. Whitney, "U.S. and Europe of 2 Minds on Security Needs," International Herald Tribune, December 3-4, 1994, 1 & 4.

(10) "Split in Republican Ranks on Bosnia," International Herald Tribune, December 7, 1994, 6.

(11) Charles Krauthammer, "Gingrich Has No Business on This Bosnia War Path," International Herald Tribune, December 10-11, 1994, 6.

(12) Anthony Lewis, "The Ghost in the White House is Fast Running Out of Time," International Herald Tribune, December 10-11, 1994, 6; Stanley Hoffmann, "Appeasement Again: Like Ethiopia, Like Czechoslovakia," International Herald Tribune, December 6, 1994, 6.

(13) Stephen Rosenfeld, "If NATO Won't Save Bosnia, Why Would It Save Central Europeans," International Herald Tribune, December 3-4, 1994, 8.

(14) Reports of remarks made by Mr. Zhirinovsky were printed in newspapers like the New York Daily News in Spring 1994.

(15) William Pfaff, "The New Job for NATO Should Be Security Eastward," International Herald Tribune, December 8,1994, 6.

(16) Ibid

(17) Steven Greenhouse, "Links to Russia at a Low Point, U.S. Aides Say," International Herald Tribune, December 9, 1994, 1 & 10.

(18) Jane Perlez, "Poland Seeks Ties to European Union," New York Times, March 12, 1994, 4.

(19) "World Wire," The Wall Street Journal Europe, December 9-10, 1994, 1.

(20) Fr‚d‚ric Bobin, "M. Balladur propose la construction d'une "arm‚e europ‚enne"," Le Monde, le 9 d‚cembre 1994, 4.

(21) Ambassador Stuart E. Eizenstat, "The U.S. Relationship to the EU and the Changing Europe," Warsaw, October 28, 1994, 6.

(22) Ibid

(23) Charles Goldsmith, "Russia Balks at NATO's Plan to Study Alliance's Growth," The Wall Street Journal Europe, December 2-3, 1994, 2.

(24) Erich Inciyan, "Fran‡ois Mitterrand presse Charles Pasqua de ne pas freiner la mise en place d'Europol," Le Monde, le 9 d‚cembre 1994, 4.

(25) Interview, German Foreign Ministry, Bonn, 6 December 1994.

(26) Interview, USEU, Brussels, 8 December 1994.

(27) Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 21 November 1994.

(28) Fran‡ois Duchˆne, Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1994).

(29) Terence Roth and Charles Goldsmith, "Lean Toward the East Promises To Strain Cornerstone of EU," The Wall Street Journal Europe, December 8, 1994, 1 & 10.

(30) Helen Cooper and John Harwood, "GATT Raises Stakes in U.S. Political Battle for Middle-Class Voters," The Wall Street Journal Europe, December 2-3, 1994, 1 & 8; Bob Herbert, "Not Much GATT Cheer in Brooklyn," International Herald Tribune, December 3-4, 1994, 8.

(31) Thierry de Montbrial, "L'OTAN en difficult‚," Le Figaro, le 7 d‚cembre 1994, 2.

(32) Lucas Delattre, Volker R�he: "Il ne peut y avoir qu'une solution politique au conflit," Le Monde, le 9 d‚cembre 1994, 6.

(33) Sylvia Ascarelli, "EU Creeps Ahead on Monetary Union With Stealth Panel," The Wall Street Journal Europe, December 2-3, 1994, 1 & 8.